Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 30

Issue 2

Article 5

10-1-2007

Fallow Fields Initiatives and Canada's East Coast Offshore: Policy
and Legal Considerations
Raymond E. Quesnel
Quesnel, Burnet, Duckworth & Palmer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raymond E. Quesnel, "Fallow Fields Initiatives and Canada's East Coast Offshore: Policy and Legal
Considerations" (2007) 30:2 Dal LJ 457.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Raymond E. Quesnel*

Fallow Field Initiatives and Canada's
East Coast Offshore: Policy and Legal
Considerations

The author examines various approaches adopted by government to balance the
state's interest in promoting the timely and efficient exploration and development
of oil and gas resources under state jurisdiction and industry's need for legal
regimes providing securityof tenure and other conditions necessary for commercial
success. In particular, the paper considers fallow field initiatives adopted by the
United Kingdom in respect of the North Sea and their possible application to
government's management of oil and gas resources in the Canadian east coast
offshore areas, addressing applicable policy considerations, the legislative history
of the statutory frameworks in place, and related jurisprudence.

L'auteur examine diverses m~thodes adopt6es par le gouvernement pour
6quilibrerI'intPrtde I'ttat- promouvoir I'exploration et I'exploitation efficientes, en
temps opportun, des ressources en hydrocarbures qui sont de sa comp6tence et le besoin qu'a Iindustrie de r6gimes I6gislatifslui offrant la s~curitO de tenure et
d'autres conditions essentielles i sa r~ussite commerciale. En particulier, Particle
examine les projets dits de - champs en jachure - adopt~s par le Royaume-Uni
pour la Mer du Nord et leur application possible ' la gestion, par le gouvernement,
des ressources en hydrocarbures de la r6gion extrac6tibre de Pest du Canada; il
aborde les considerations politiques applicables, le contexte historique du cadre
16gislatifen place et la jurisprudence connexe.
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Introduction
Governments with varying degrees of urgency are concerned with the pace
of development of oil and gas resources under their jurisdiction.I This is to
be expected. Governments, in their capacity both as owners of oil and gas
resources and regulators of oil and gas operations, have a responsibility to
ensure that such resources are developed to maximize revenue and other
benefits to be derived from these resources. Hence, governments attempt
to devise fiscal and tenure systems to meet these governmental objectives
while not discouraging investment from the private sector. This is no easy
task and is rarely achieved to the satisfaction of all. Oil companies assist
in the attainment of government objectives by providing technical and
commercial expertise and capital, and by assuming most, but not all, of the
risk. That being said, oil companies report to shareholders, not electorates,
and a divergence of interest is inevitable. This paper considers Canada's
experience regarding fallow fields issues on its east coast continental shelf
1. A recent and particularly relevant example of this is the policy statement issued by the Government
of Newfoundland and Labrador on II September 2007 entitled "Focussing Our Energy, Newfoundland
and Labrador Energy Plan" where the Government specifically addresses fallow fields issues relating
to the Newfoundland offshore. A copy of this document can be found on the Government's website at
<www.gov.nl.ca/energyplan/EnergyReport.pdf>..
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(CCS). The history of the current CCS tenure system is reviewed as are
the policy and legal issues associated with the existing legislation and
other options available to governments to spur development. The United
Kingdom's experience with these issues regarding its continental shelf
(UKCS) is also reviewed to provide further insights.
I. The fallowfield issue
Use of the term "fallow field" may be unique to the UKCS, but the
underlying issues are of concern to all jurisdictions. What are the fallow
field issues and what is at stake? Simply put, governments make acreage
available to oil companies for exploration with the hope that oil and gas
discoveries will be made and development will occur with its attendant
benefits including revenue (by way of taxes, royalties, rentals and bonuses,
or combinations thereof), increased employment, industrial activity and
technology transfer. In exchange, oil companies assume certain risks
and obligations to explore and develop acreage in the hope of making a
profit, increasing shareholder value, and realizing target rates of return.
It is a bargain between government and industry. To sweeten the bargain,
governments use a variety of incentives to attract industry investment.
These include favourable tax and royalty rates and attractive licence
terms. To balance the equation, there are obligations, such as work and
expenditure commitments, restrictions on length of tenure, relinquishment
of acreage, and termination of licences in the absence of performance and,
ultimately exploration success. The details of the bargain are found in the
governing legislation and the terms and conditions of the licences granted.
This paper focuses on one aspect of the bargain, the tenure regime as an
instrument of government policy. It explores the question of how long
exclusive exploration and development rights should be held without
positive results, or at least some minimal level of ongoing activity. It
discusses how the challenge of the fallow field issue has been addressed
in Canada and how it might be addressed in the future.
II. A briefsurvey of tenure systems
It has been said that there are more petroleum fiscal systems in the world
than there are countries.2 The same can be said of tenure systems. Fiscal
systems and tenure systems are different aspects, ideally complementary,
of governmental attempts to establish successful oil and gas regimes. As
background, this paper examines some tenure based approaches to fallow
2.
D. Johnston, InternationalPetroleum FiscalSystems and ProductionSharing Contracts(Tulsa:
PennWell, 1994) at 5. This work provides an excellent analysis of fiscal issues and their relation to
licence terms and conditions in numerous regimes throughout the world.
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field issues in a number of jurisdictions to set the-stage for the detailed
analysis of the CCS and UKCS fallow initiatives that follows.
1. Internationally
Most of the oil and gas reserves in the world including the Middle East,
Africa, China, South America, Indonesia and Russia are governed by one
form or other of a production sharing contract regime.3 Typically, these
regimes provide for a relatively short exploration period combined with
work or expenditure commitments and land relinquishment at specified
intervals. At the end of the exploration period, the onus is on the oil
company to demonstrate that a commercial discovery has been made,
in which case there follows a longer production period during which
the oil company is entitled to exploit the agreed discovery area for the
production of petroleum. If there is no commercial discovery at the end
of the exploration period, all acreage reverts to the state. At the end of the
production period, not only all acreage but, in many cases, all production
and related facilities revert to the state as well. The rule is work it or lose
it.
2. Australia
Australia has a tenure system which is in many respects similar to that
applicable to the CCS. Offshore acreage seaward of the three-mile
territorial sea is under thejurisdiction of the federal government ofAustralia
(Commonwealth), while the landward balance of offshore acreage is
under the jurisdiction of the adjacent state. For acreage under federal
jurisdiction, the governing legislation is the Petroleum (SubmergedLands)
Act 1967.4 The legislation is administered jointly by the Commonwealth
and the applicable coastal state, which is similar in certain respects to the
joint federal-provincial resource management regime established by the
AccordActs5 The Australian regime was designed to address jurisdictional
disputes between the Commonwealth and the states. It has served as a
model for the Canadian offshore legislation. The Australian regime has a
three-tiered tenure system, not unlike the one applicable to the CCS, but
with some important differences. The available oil and gas titles are the
exploration permit, the retention lease and the production licence.
The exploration permit (comparable to the CCS exploration licence) is
granted for six years. During the first three years, the licensee is obligated

3. Ibid. In particular, see Appendix A: Sample Fiscal Systems at 207 ff. for a summary of fiscal and
licence tenure terms of numerous jurisdictions internationally.
(Cth.), as amended.
4.
Infra note 13.
5.
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to carry out a guaranteed work program, failing which the permit is
cancelled. During the second three-year period of the exploration permit
term, work is guaranteed on a year-to-year basis only. The exploration
permit is renewable for two additional five-year terms. There is a fifty per
cent relinquishment requirement in respect of outstanding acreage at each
renewal.
If a potentially commercial discovery is made, the permittee may
apply for a retention lease. The discovery need not be commercially
viable, but simply indicate a reasonable chance of becoming commercially
viable within fifteen years. The retention lease is renewable for five-year
periods. At each stage, the onus is on the permittee to meet this hurdle.
The retention lease is the Australian equivalent of the significant discovery
licence available for acreage in the CCS. Like the CCS significant discovery
licence, it offers a degree of long-term tenure but it is not indefinite and the
bar for obtaining the grant of such a lease is higher, putting the onus on the
permittee to establish that there is a reasonable chance that the discovery
might become commercial in the future.
If a commercial discovery is made during the term of the exploration
permit, the permittee may within two years apply for a production licence.
The term of a production licence is for the duration of commercial
production plus five years. As a condition of the granting of the production
licence, the permittee must provide details of its development proposal,
not unlike the development plan contemplated by the AccordActs. Further
details of the Australian regime can be found on the Australian Department
6
of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research website.
3. Alberta
In Alberta, oil and gas tenure is governed by the Mines and Minerals
Act.7 Typically, petroleum and natural gas leases are issued for a primary
term of five years. Pursuant to section 82(1) of that Act, leases may be
continued beyond their primary term if continuation thereof is approved
by the Minister under the Petroleum andNaturalGas Tenure Regulations.'
Under the regulations, a lease will be continued if there is a producing
well or a well capable of production in paying quantity. There is little
jurisprudence considering these legislative provisions. The Alberta Court
of Appeal in R. v. IndustrialCoal and Minerals9 considered the question
of lease continuation under the Mines and Minerals Act. The case is
6.
7.
8.

<http://www.innovation.gov.au>.
R.S.A. 2000, c. M-17.
Alta. Reg. 263/97.

9.

[1979] 5 W.W.R. 102 (Alta. C.A.).
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interesting because it exhibits a great deal of curial deference. The question
was whether the well in question was capable of production of petroleum
or natural gas in paying quantity so as to qualify the lease for continuation
beyond its primary term. In the words of Moir J.A.:
That was the minister's decision-it is final and is not to be reviewed-as
to its validity in this type of proceeding. The minister had the power and
the duty to decide. He did so and that is the end of the matter. We think
that this decision was eminently reasonable. °
There was no discussion of what constitutes paying quantity and not much
appetite exhibited for judicial review of ministerial decisions regarding
continuation of leases. Indeed, there is little Canadian jurisprudence
generally on what constitutes "paying quantity." Whatever case law there
is has been reviewed by R. H. Bartlett 1 along with relevant United States
authorities. The jurisprudence deals with the construction of the granting,
habendum and shut-in clauses in freehold oil and gas leases. Owners
of freehold oil and gas estates share governments' desire to maximise
economic returns but, of course, cannot be expected to share governments'
concern for broader policy issues. This line of jurisprudence may be of
interest in the construction of language used in the Alberta legislation. It
is not, however, particularly helpful in respect of the fallow field issues
confronting the CCS. Suffice to say, generally fallow field issues have
not been .a particular concern in Alberta apart from deep rights reversion
12
which as an issue was confronted and dealt with in the 1980s.
III. The Canadianoffshore experience
Oil and gas tenure and operations on the CCS are governed by legislation
implementing the Atlantic Accord entered into by the Government of
Canada and the Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador on 11 February
1985 and the Canada-NovaScotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord
entered into by the Government of Canada and the Government of Nova

10. Ibid. at 102.
11. R. H. Bartlett, "The Effect of Low Oil and Gas Prices on Freehold Oil and Gas Leases: A Problem
of Interpretation" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 1.
12. Alberta petroleum and natural gas leases are relatively small in areal extent compared to licences
granted in respect of acreage in respect of the CCS but typically grant rights from surface to basement.
The fallow issue here was the failure to explore and develop deeper rights. The Mines and Minerals
Act was amended to provide for reversion to the Crown of rights stratigraphically below the deepest
producing formation.

Fallow Field Initiatives and Canada's East Coast
Offshore: Policy and Legal Considerations

463

Scotia on 26 August 1986.13 The provisions of the implementing legislation
of the federal government and the two provinces insofar as they relate to
the fallow field issues discussed in this paper are essentially identical.
The Accord Acts implement a political settlement of the federalprovincial constitutional dispute concerning jurisdiction over offshore oil
and gas resources. The settlement is a joint federal-provincial resource
management scheme administered by the Canada-Newfoundland and
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB) and the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (CNSOPB) for the Newfoundland
offshore area and the Nova Scotia offshore area, respectively. 4 The
AccordActs establish the Boards, 5 provide for a certain degree of political
oversight over fundamental decisions of the Boards and contemplate the
federal and provincial governments acting in tandem where legislation
must be amended and regulations promulgated. The core oil and gas
aspects of the Accord Acts are modelled on the Canada Petroleum
Resources Act 6 and the Canada Oil and Gas OperationsAct. 7 Insofar as
fallow field issues are concerned, the legislation governing the CCS and
those lands under exclusive federal jurisdiction are substantively the same.
As such, to understand the current CCS land tenure system and related
fallow field issues, one must consider the history of Canadian federal oil
and gas legislation and policy.
It was not until the proclamation of the Canada Oil and Gas Act 8 on
5 March 1982, that the oil and gas licensing and tenure system for Canada's
north and offshore areas was first statutorily entrenched. Prior to that time,
rights were granted pursuant to regulations promulgated from time to
time under federal statutes, initially under the Dominion Lands Act 9 and

13. Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3 [FederalAccord
Act]; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and
Labrador Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. C-2; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord
ImplementationAct, S.C. 1988, c. 28; and Canada-NovaScotia Offshore PetroleumResources Accord
Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 [co.llectively, Accord Acts]. For convenience,
where section references to the legislation are made, they are to the FederalAccordAct.
14. See Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792; Reference
Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86; and
Canada (A.G.) v. British Columbia (A.G), [1984] 4 W.W. R. 289 (S.C.C.). In each of these cases, the
matter in dispute was which level of government has jurisdiction over offshore resources and in each
case, subject to some exceptions not relevant to this paper, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in
favour of the federal government.
15. For convenience, the CNLOPB and the CNSOPB are referred to individually as the Board and,
collectively, as the Boards.
16. R.S.C. 1985, c. 36 (2d Supp.).
17. R.S.C 1985, c. 0-7.
18. S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c.81.
19. Now the Public Lands GrantsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-30.
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then later under the TerritorialLands Act. 20 These regulations date back
to 1914 and continued in force with amendments from time to time until
1982, when the regulations were superceded (with some exceptions) by
the Cianada Oil and Gas Act. The various regulations responded to the
perceived policy concerns of the day, including a need to ascertain the
extent of northern resources (the development of such resources being
seen as a key part of the economic development of the north), and a need to
exert Canadian sovereignty in the north and, eventually, on the continental
shelf of Canada after the adoption in 1958 of the Geneva Convention on
the ContinentalShelf This convention affirmed that coastal states exercise
sovereign rights over the adjacent continental shelf for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting the natural resources.2 The Canada Oil and
Gas Act also addressed a growing concern over Canadian ownership and
control of Canada's strategic oil and gas resources. The promulgation in
1961 of the Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations22 can be seen as the
beginning of the modem era of land tenure for the Canadian north and
offshore areas.
The regime established by the 1961 Land Regulations can be
characterized as intentionally generous to industry, with minimal restrictions
on entry and with Canadian ownership requirements attaching only to the
later lease stage of the licensing system, not the initial exploratory permit
stage. In a speech describing the regime to the Mines Ministers' Conference
in Quebec on 18 October 1960, the Honourable Alvin Hamilton stated:
These regulations are designed, first of all, to encourage exploitation
and assessment of resources. For the time being, we can afford to forego
maximum short term cash returns but we cannot afford to continue in
ignorance of what resources we have.
Obviously, oil companies are not going to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars on exploration, just to oblige government. The regulations must
offer a reasonable prospect of a worthwhile return on this investment.
In the final analysis, this means a competitive cost for.., oil delivered
to market.
Low cost oil means bolder land patterns in permit and lease. It means
keeping down land acquisition costs. It means not drilling more wells
20. R.S.C 1985, c.T-7.
21. Convention on the Law of the Sea: The ContinentalShelf UN Doc. A/Conf. 13/1.52-L.55 (1958),
Art. 2.
22. P.C. 1961-797, promulgated 6 June 1961 [1961 Land Regulations].
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than are necessary to fully exploit a "basin", and it means unitized
operations of pools. The new regulations provide for these conditions. In
this context, I might just mention in passing that we are endeavouring to
collaborate as closely as we can with the oil and gas industry.
The government's enunciation of the purpose and effect of the new regime
could hardly have been clearer. Furthermore, the direct involvement of
industry in designing the regime was openly acknowledged. Measured
against the government of the day's own criteria, the 1961 LandRegulations
were successful in stimulating frontier exploration efforts, adding to the
geological knowledge base and asserting, in a demonstrable way, Canada's
claim to sovereignty in the far north.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it may be said that the very
success of the regime instituted by the 1961 Land Regulations was to be
its undoing. Viewed from another perspective, the result of the regime was
that the oil and gas rights to vast areas of the North (and later southern
offshore areas) had been disposed of on terms that did not result in work
actually being undertaken on all areas held under permit, yet granted
tenure that might extend, in some cases, into the 21st Century.23 By the late
1960s, particularly in the wake of the discovery of petroleum in Prudhoe
Bay in 1968, the federal government had begun to have second thoughts
about the wisdom of its earlier generosity and began designing a new land
management regime for Canada's offshore and northern regions.
The first official action in this exercise was the revocation on 11 May
1970 of Oil and Gas Land Order No. 1-1961,24 which had previously
enabled a permittee to avoid the fifty per cent relinquishment requirement
contained in the 1961 Land Regulations by giving the permittee the
right to lease corridor acreage subject to the payment of an incremental
royalty. Corridor acreage was potentially valuable acreage discovered
by industry effort that reverted to the Crown and became available for
further disposition or, possibly, further exploration and development by
the Crown itself. The government's action precipitated the first allegations
of interference with acquired or vested rights. These allegations would
persist through the 1970s and later under the National Energy Program
(NEP) announced on 28 October 1980.
The federal government's review exercise encountered a series
of unforeseen events that resulted in the repeated postponement of its
completion. In August 1972, the Atlantic Provinces and Quebec announced
23. For a detailed criticism of the 1961 Land Regulations, see Thompson & Crommelin, "Canada's
Petroleum Leasing Policy-A Cornucopia for Whom?" The Can. Forum (June-July 1973).
24. S.O.R./61-461, promulgated 12 October 1961 and revoked by S.O.R./70-184.

466

The Dalhousie Law Journal

an agreement among themselves to avoid the problem of constitutional
jurisdiction over offshore areas by negotiating directly with Ottawa. The
federal government would have found it difficult to proceed unilaterally
with an overhaul of its regulatory regime (which applied to the East Coast
as well as to the North) in the face of this development. Then, in December
1973, the Middle East oil embargo occurred, resulting in the first of the
international oil price shocks of the 1970s, which added a new dimension
to energy policy-making.
By May 1976, however, the federal government was ready to
proceed and tabled its Statement of Policy entitled Proposed Petroleum
and Natural Gas Act and New Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations,
subsequently known as the "Green paper." Bill C-20 was tabled in the
House of Commons and was intended to implement this new policy. Bill
C-20 died on the parliamentary agenda, but in 1977 the government was
able to implement many of its features by a major overhaul of the 1961
Land Regulations themselves. These 1977 amendments became known
as the "Bridging Regulations. ' 25 Henceforth, new land issuances were to
be on the basis of exploration agreements containing work commitments
for an area comprised of more or less contiguous grids, in response to
competitive calls for bids. The newly established Petro-Canada was given
certain special rights.
IV. The NationalEnergy Program (NEP)
The NEP was implemented in response to concerns over increasing costs
of imported oil and a lack of stability in international sources of supply
brought on by Middle East embargoes and substantial price escalations
engineered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The
policy objectives of the NEP included:
a. the accelerated exploration and development of Canadian oil and
gas resources particularly in the north and offshore areas under
federal jurisdiction with a view to attaining energy self-sufficiency
and security of supply, such exploration and development being
spurred by a compulsory fallow field process combined with
government grants under the Petroleum Incentives Program;
b. the attainment of a greater degree ofCanadian ownership in the
upstream Canadian oil and gas industry spurred by incentives under
the Petroleum Incentives Program generally and, preferentially,
25. P.C. 1977-2155, promulgated 3 August 1977, and P.C. 1977-3160, promulgated 13 November
1977.
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for exploration activities undertaken on federal lands and for
exploration by entities having a higher degree of Canadian
ownership and control;
c. greater direct federal government involvement- in the upstream
Canadian oil and gas industry through the reservation to the federal
government of a carried interest in oil and gas production projects
on federal lands (the so-called Crown share) and the use of PetroCanada, then a federal Crown corporation, as the government's
window on the industry; and
d. new tax measures intended to redress the perceived fiscal imbalance
created by significantly increased resource revenues flowing to
the treasuries of the oil and gas producing provinces.
With the passage of over twenty-five years, it should not be forgotten
that a major aspect of the NEP was in fact a fallow field exercise intended
to increase exploration and development activity in northern and offshore
areas held under permits and leases issued pursuant to the Canada Oil
and Gas Land Regulations.26 As noted above, the tenure system under the
regulations was intended to be generous. Over time, the system came to
be seen by policy makers as overly generous to the oil companies and not
conducive to the desired level of exploration and development activity. The
legislative response is found in the CanadaOil and Gas Act, a resurrected
version of the earlier Bill C-20.
The new Canada Oil and Gas Act required the holders of all
former permits, former special renewal permits, and former exploration
agreements issued under the regulations to negotiate new exploration
agreements with the federal government, failing which the lands under
such permits and agreements were deemed to be surrendered and to
become Crown reserve lands.2 7 Similarly, the holders of all former leases
issued under the regulations that had not produced oil or gas other than for
test purposes were required to do the same, failing which the lands under
such leases were deemed to be surrendered and to become Crown reserve
lands.28 Exceptions were made for lands governed by the Normal Wells
Agreement of 194429 and several grandfathered leases that had already
produced commercially.30 In effect, virtually all Crown lands under licence
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

C.R.C., c. 1518.
Supra note 18, s. 63.
Ibid. s. 64 (1), (2) and (3).
Ibid. s. 64(4).
Ibid. s. 64 (5).
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to the oil companies were to be surrendered unless the oil companies
negotiated new exploration agreements. The legislation was administered
by the Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration (COGLA). It was the
policy of COGLA that exploration agreements contain new seismic and
drilling obligations and periodic land relinquishment. Needless to say,
this fallow field initiative by the federal government was extremely
unpopular with oil companies and was viewed by them as confiscatory
in nature. In the end, approximately two hundred exploration agreements
were negotiated by COGLA with the industry but, interestingly, only a
handful of exploration agreements were ever actually signed by the oil
companies. The industry maintained a strong lobby effort over several
years to have the legislation amended. It did not want to be seen to have
accepted the confiscatory aspects of the Act, notably the reservation of
the twenty-five per cent Crown share, the intrusiveness of the fallow field
initiative in the affairs of the oil companies and what was perceived as an
excessive degree of ministerial discretion inherent in the Canada Oil and
Gas Act. The enactment in 1987 of the CanadaPetroleum Resources Act"
was essentially a response to industry objections to the NEP
The confiscatory nature of certain aspects of the Canada Oil and
Gas Act was obvious to the drafters of the legislation. So too were the
implications of certain decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. In the
absence of constitutional protection of private property rights, legislatures
may interfere with vested or acquired rights but must do so explicitly.
Spooner OilsLtd. v. Turner Valley Gas ConservationBoard3 2 is often cited
for the proposition that there is a presumption that vested or acquired rights
are not to be interfered with legislatively unless the legislation expressly
or by unavoidable inference permits such interference. There is also a
common law proposition that there is an implied right to compensation
for the deprivation of property, which proposition was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in ManitobaFisheriesLtd. v. the Queen.33 This
implied right may be overridden by express statutory language.3 4 With
these considerations in mind, section 61(1) of the Canada Oil and Gas
Act states that "the interests provided for under this Act replace all oil and
gas rights or prospects thereof acquired or vested in relation to Canada
lands prior to the coming into force of this Act." Section 61(2) goes on to
provide that
31. Supra note 16.
32. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 545 (S.C.C.).
33. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 462 (S.C.C.).
34. See further, R. J. Harrison, "The Legal Characterization of Petroleum Licences" (1980) 58 Can.
B. Rev. 483.
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no party shall have any right to claim or receive any compensation,

damages, indemnity or other form of relief from Her Majesty in right of
Canada ...
for any acquired, vested or future right or entitlement or any
prospect thereof that is replaced or otherwise affected by
this Act, or for
5
any duty or liability imposed on that party by this Act.1
The legislative intent could hardly have been made more clear.
The oil industry viewed the fallow field initiative established by the
CanadaOil and Gas Act together with the reservation of the Crown share
as unwarranted and interventionist. Indeed, it was considered so draconian
as to elicit diplomatic intervention (ultimately, to no avail) by the United
States by way of an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of
State and Canada's Minister of External Affairs. The Canada Oil and Gas
Act did, however, give statutory recognition to the concept of the significant
discovery and the right to indefinite tenure in respect of lands containing
a significant discovery.36 This appears to be a recognition that the fallow

field exercise was sweeping and confiscatory in nature. The Act provided
that the term of an exploration agreement in respect of lands subject to a
significant discovery declaration would be extended indefinitely for so
long as the declaration remained in force. The Act recognized that the
northern frontier and the offshore areas were difficult and expensive areas
in which to conduct oil and gas operations and that, having regard to the
technical challenges and enormous capital requirements of production
projects, a long term intermediate form of land tenure was appropriate.
From the government's perspective as resource owner, there needed to
be countervailing statutory levers to encourage or force activity if need
be. Accordingly, the Canada Oil and GasAct reserved to government the
power to order drilling operations as the quid pro quo for the indefinitetenure afforded to significant discoveries and commercial discoveries.
With some modifications and refinements, the basic tenure system was
carried forward under the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, which
legislation replaced the CanadaOil and Gas Act and formed the basis for
the Accord Acts. The current CCS tenure system and related fallow field
issues are discussed later in this paper. Ironically, current concerns over
potential fallow field issues in respect of the CCS can be traced to the

35. Supra note 18, s. 61(1) and (2).
36. See supra note 18. The definition of significant discovery was first introduced in the Bridging
Regulations, supranote 25, but for a somewhat different purpose. Under the Bridging Regulations, the
making of a significant discovery allowed the licence holder to opt for the issuance of a special renewal
permit in lieu of making a lease selection, thus avoiding relinquishment of lands that otherwise would
have been required.
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earlier fallow field initiative of the NEP and the legislative response to
opposition thereto.
V. The U.K experience
Tenure in the UKCS is governed by the Petroleum Act 1998.37 This Act
consolidates and replaces the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 8 and
the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975.39 Under the 1998 Act
and its predecessor legislation, licences are issued for exploration and
development ofoil and gas resources in the UKCS. The licences incorporate
various model clauses set forth in regulations made from time to time.
The Secretary of State is authorized under the Act to exclude or modify
the model clauses in particular cases. The 1998 Act consolidates and to
some extent replaces the various model clauses incorporated from time
to time under the earlier legislation. 40 While the legislation authorizes the
granting of licences, it does not set out in detail the rights and obligations
of licensees. To understand what these rights and obligations are, one must
look to the model clauses in force at the time a particular licence is granted.
Having regard to the lengthy history of the legislation and shifting policy
objectives over time, this is not a simple task. Fortunately, a summary of
the tenure system exists 41 and a good overview of the licensing system is
available from the Department of Trade and Industry.42
While there are several types of licences available, there is not a threetiered tenure system comparable to the one under the Accord Acts. While
there is a seaward area exploration licence, it grants only non-exclusive,
rather limited exploration rights and, unlike the exploration licence under
the AccordActs, it does not confer exclusive rights to acquire a production
licence in respect of discoveries made. The type of licence relevant to the
topic of this paper is the seaward area production licence which is granted
pursuant to a competitive public tender process. Offshore licensing began
in the 1960s with the rapid development of the North Sea. There are several

37. (U.K), 1998, c.17, as amended [1998 Act]. Ministerial functions under this legislation are
exercised by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (DTI).
38. (U.K.), 1934, c. 36, as amended.
39. (U.K.), 1975, c. 74, as amended.
40. See Petroleum (CurrentModel Clauses) Order 1999, S.l. 1999/160 and the Petroleum Licensing
(Explorationand Production) (Seawardand LandwardAreas)Regulations2004, S.I. 2004/352.
41. See T.C. Daintith, G.D.M. Willoughby & A.D.G. Hill, UnitedKingdom Oil and Gas Law, 3d ed.
by A.D.G. Hill (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) Vol. 1 at 1.121 et seq. and Vol. 3 at 5731-5372/7
[Hill].
42. See DTI Licensing: Overview at <bttp://www.org.dti.gov.uk/upstream/licensingoverview.
htm>.
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forms of seaward area production licences, namely the standard licence,
frontier area licence and the promote licence. 43 As pointed out by Hill:
Certain of the licence clauses have always had as their aim the
encouragement of specific exploration work in a timely fashion.
Traditionally the approach has been to grant the licence for a relatively
short initial period during which ... certain specified exploration had to
be carried out. This work programme will have been agreed between the
licensees and the Department of Trade and Industry ... prior to the award
of the licence. Conditionally upon this work programme having been
carried out, the licensee is given the right, on surrendering a specified
proportion of the originally licensed area at the end of this initial period,
to continue the licence as to the remaining area for a further term
considered long enough to enable any discoveries that had been made to
be developed and depleted before the licence expires."
Currently, a typical seaward area production licence has three periods or
terms and is designed to follow the typical lifecycle of a field, namely
exploration, appraisal and production. This is similar in many respects to
the three-tiered tenure system under the Accord Acts. The initial term is
four years but may be longer for frontier licences. The licence expires
at the end of the initial term unless the required work program has been
completed. At that time, a fixed amount of acreage (usually fifty per cent)
must be relinquished. The second term is for a period of four years and is
intended for appraisal and development. The licence expires at the end of
the second term unless the Secretary of State has approved a development
plan for commercial discoveries. The third term is intended for production
and lasts for eighteen years. The evolution of the stricter terms and
conditions of the current form of seaward production licence (i.e. shorter
initial and second terms, compulsory land relinquishment and mandatory
work program usually comprising seismic surveying and the drilling of one
or more wells) reflects the Department's policy that oil companies must
work their licences. Escalating annual rentals based on acreage reinforce
that policy. The Department of Trade and Industry positively encourages
the surrender of acreage unless the licensee actually intends to work it."

43. The frontier area licence is similar to the standard licence with modifications to accommodate the
time and technical requirements inherent in the more difficult operating conditions of frontier areas.
The promote licence represents an innovative approach to stimulate activity through the granting of
licences to companies which may not have the financial or technical resources to conduct offshore
operations themselves but which may have novel ideas as to how to do so in respect of fallow acreage.
It is hoped that such new ideas will be developed and promoted to operators with the requisite capacity
to undertake operations adopting such ideas.
44. Supranote41,Vol.l at 1123.
45. Supra note 42.
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The history of the UK offshore tenure system can be seen as a series
of amendments to the model clauses contained in seaward production
licences in an effort to encourage exploration and development activity.
Nevertheless, as Hill notes:
Further deliberation on appropriate ways to promote and accelerate
drilling and production activity resulted in the wholesale abandonment for
the 20"' licensing round, opened in January 2002, of the approach to term
of licence, surrender and relinquishment reflected in the amendments
to model clauses made in 1996. The Progressing Partnership Work
Group set up by PILOT, after examining the structure and operation of
the current UKCS licensing regime with a view to eliminating factors
that acted to limit or delay successful drilling and production activities,
concluded that the standard UKCS approach of long licence terms and
low annual rentals, combined with limited relinquishment and activity
obligations, provides an environment where there is too little pressure
6n licensees to deliver value from their licences. From this flowed
recommendations, which have been accepted by DTI, first to adopt a
new approach for future licences, starting with those awarded in the 20"'
round, and secondly to improve performance under existing licences,
specifically on fallow blocks and fallow discoveries.46
Evidently experimentation over the years through modification of licence
terms and conditions, the traditional resource management lever utilized
by government in its capacity as resource owner, was not considered
adequate to meet government policy objectives. Accordingly, the U.K.
fallow field initiative was implemented in 2002. At that time there were
over 300 undeveloped discoveries on the UKCS estimated to contain more
than six billion barrels of oil equivalent.4" The U.K. fallow field initiative
is significantly different from the fallow field exercise undertaken by
Canada under the NEP through the Canada Oil and Gas Act. The U.K.
approach is not a statutorily imposed scheme with retrospective effect but,
rather, operates prospectively through the use of modified licence terms
and conditions offered under future licensing rounds to which industry is
free to respond as it sees fit. It also operates retrospectively through moral
suasion and government-industry cooperation.

46. Supra note 41, Vol.l at 1125.
47. See Colin Cranfield & Peter Naylor, "Unlocking the Potential from UKCS Low Deliverability
Reservoirs" (Paper presented to SPE/EUROPEL, Aberdeen, 29-31 October 2002) [unpublished],
online: UK Department for business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform <http://www.og.berr.gov.
uk/information/papers/index.htm>. For a concise and informative summary of the U.K. fallow
field initiative see Colin Cranfield, "DTI/PILOT Initiatives to Promote Exploration and New Field
Development", online: (2003) No. 4 SHARP IOR eNewsletter <http.//ior.senergyltd.com/issue 4/
Articles/DTIFallow/index.htm>.
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The Department of Trade and Industry studies of undeveloped
discoveries and low deliverability reservoirs conclude that there are
a number of technical barriers and non-technical barriers to optimum
development. 48 As noted by Cranfield, the technical barriers include
uncertain reservoir characterization, low reservoir energy, reservoir
complexity and low permeability. Non-technical barriers include lack of
access to infrastructure, partner and treaty issues, transportation tariffs
and outdated gas sales agreements and high cost for licence take-overs
and acquisition of existing seismic data. A variety of technical and
commercial solutions to these barriers were identified and are summarized
in the article by Cranfield.
VI. U.K. fallowfield initiative
The intent of the U.K. fallow field initiative, introduced in 2002, is to
ensure that acreage and potentially economic developments are actively
worked. A detailed description of the initiative, the procedures followed
and Department of Transport and Industry guidance notes can be found
on the Department's website. 49 Hill's summary of the U.K. fallow
field process provides a helpful introduction to this complex topic. 0
The initiative is the result of government-industry consultation and is
voluntary in nature. There is no fallow field legislation as such; however,
amendments to production licence model clauses do afford a legal basis
for cancellation of licences or mandatory relinquishment of acreage for
failure to carry out additional exploration or development in the fallow
field context (at least for licences issued at a time when these clauses
were in effect and incorporated by reference). The writer is not aware
of any cases challenging the retrospective application of the fallow field
initiative even in the absence of a firm statutory basis for its application.
What follows is a simplified description of, and commentary on, the U.K.
fallow field process which borrows heavily from Hill.5
Each year the Department of Transport and Industry makes an
assessment of which acreage it considers fallow and posts this on its
website. Acreage is considered fallow if no recent significant activity has
been carried out in respect of the acreage; that is to say, there has been
no drilling for four years or no dedicated seismic for two years. Fallow

48. Ibid.
49. <http://www.berr.gov.uk>. The Department is now called Department for Business Enterprise &
Regulatory Reform.
50. Supra note 41, Vol. 1 at 1126-27.
51. Appendix I of this paper sets out the writer's understanding of the U.K. fallow field process in
schematic form.
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acreage is divided into two groups: Fallow Blocks and Fallow Discoveries.
Fallow Blocks comprise acreage on which no discovery has been made.
Fallow Discoveries comprise acreage on which a discovery of oil or.gas
has been made. For this purpose, a discovery is any discovery whether or
not determined to be commercially viable. This approximates the CCS
significant discovery.
Fallow'Blocks are further divided into two categories, namely Fallow A
and Fallow B. Fallow A Blocks are blocks held by a technically competent
licence holder considered by the Department to be doing all that can be
expected with the acreage in the circumstances. The status of Fallow A
Blocks is reviewed biannually to determine if they should: (i) remain fallow
and thus subject to further review; (ii) be removed from the fallow category
because of subsequent significant activity; or (iii) be reclassified as Fallow
B. Fallow B Blocks are blocks held by licensees who are unable to make
progress due to partner misalignment or commercial barriers. Licensees of
Fallow B Blocks have three months to make a proposal to carry out work
and thus remove such blocks from fallow status or to attempt to market the
blocks to third parties willing to undertake work on the blocks. If some but
not all members of a licence group wish to undertake significant activity
on the fallow block, those not wishing to participate are expected to sell
their interest or withdraw. If significant activity is planned by the end of
the year, the block is designated as Fallow BR (Rescued). If no significant
activity is planned or no significant activity is completed by the end of the
year, the licensee of the Fallow B Block is expected to relinquish the fallow
acreage. Fallow B Blocks are released onto LIFT (Licence Information
For Transfer) and added to the Fallow Asset Transfer Register. It appears
that the U.K. fallow field initiative, in part, attempts to create a secondary
market in seaward area production licences supported by computerized
access to information, both of a commercial and technical nature.
The process for Fallow Discoveries is similar to that for Fallow Blocks;
however, there are some important differences. Fallow Discoveries are
divided into Fallow Discovery A and Fallow Discovery B categories.
Fallow A Discoveries are further divided into three groups, namely Linked
Fallow A, Stranded Fallow A and Active Fallow A. A Linked Fallow A
Discovery is a discovery that is associated with a nearby development. If
no significant activity is carried out or the associated development does not
proceed to completion, the licence holder is expected to sell or relinquish
the licence. A Stranded Fallow A Discovery is a discovery where the
licensee is not proceeding with development due to a lack of infrastructure
or the necessary technology. The fallow status of Stranded Fallow A
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Discoveries is reviewed annually and, like Fallow A Blocks, their status
is subject to change over time as circumstances change. Active Fallow A
Discoveries are discoveries that have been recently designated as fallow
by the Department and in respect of which licensees have undertaken
to carry out significant activity but have not yet done so. Licensees are
expected to carry out such significant activity or to relinquish the relevant
acreage.
As noted above, the U.K. seaward area production licence with
its initial exploration term followed by its appraisal and development
term and finally its production term grants, basically, the same rights
conferred sequentially and in distinct licences under the AccordActs. The
applicability of the U.K. fallow field initiative as a response to the fallow
field dilemma is discussed later in this paper.
VII. Other U.K. initiatives
The U.K. fallow field initiative was undertaken in conjunction with, or
at least in close proximity with, a variety of other initiatives intended to
promote the long term viability of the UKCS oil and gas sector and should
be considered in that context. These include among others:
1. shortened licence terms for new licences;
2. the introduction of the promote licence;
3. wider availability of technical data;
4. the establishment of a U.K.-Norway cooperation work group to
focus on key matters relating to transportation, optimal use of
infrastructure, operational synergies and mutual open-market
access;
5. the establishment of PILOT (successor to the Oil and Gas
Industry Task Force), a group of leading government and industry
representatives whose purpose is to focus on measures to secure
the long-term future of the oil and gas industry in the U.K.;
6. the introduction of a new voluntary commercial code of practice
designed to remove what were perceived to be contractual and
commercial impediments to offshore development;
7. amendments to the voluntary offshore infrastructure code of
practice;
8. the introduction of the Master Deed, a new legal framework
designed to accelerate the transfer of UKCS oil and assets and
facilitate the entry of new participants (similar in many respects
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to the CAPL Assignment Procedure widely used in the Canadian
oil and gas industry);
9. the elimination of royalties and the introduction of certain tax
changes intended to stimulate development; and
10. reforms to liberalize the U.K. gas transportation, processing and
marketing regime.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider all of these initiatives
but they do provide additional context for understanding the U.K. fallow
field initiative. The references cited below offer an introduction to these
52
topics.
VIII. Canadianeast coast offshore fallow issues
Key to understanding potential fallow field issues in relation to the CCS
are the concepts of significant discoveries and commercial discoveries and
their relation to the three-tiered tenure system ,and the statutory options
and levers available to address fallow field issues.
1. Significant discovery
A significant discovery is not a term of art in the oil and gas industry or a
term with a well understood juridical meaning such as the term "paying
quantity." Indeed, in Williams andMeyers Manual of Oil and Gas Terms53
the only definition of the term is the legislated definition contained in the
Accord Acts. The AccordActs define the term as follows:
Significant discovery means a discovery indicated by the first well on
a geological feature that demonstrates by flow testing the. existence
of hydrocarbons in that feature and, having regard to geological and
engineering factors, suggests the existence of an accumulation of
hydrocarbons that has the potential for sustained production. 4
This writer suggests that the statutory definition implies, in oil industry
terms, a technical success. It does not imply commerciality but, depending
on the circumstances, may suggest that appraisal drilling is justified. It is
not a particularly high bar to meet having regard to the consequences under
the Accord Acts for government and the holders of exploration licences.

52. See Cranfield, supra note 47; E. Pennington, "Issues For New Entrants to the UKCS-A Legal
Analysis" (2002) 1l Int'l Energy & Tax. Rev. at 281-285; and S. Gyaltsen, "The Master Deed and
Changes In the North Sea" (2003) 9 Int'l Energy & Tax. Rev. at 258-260.
53. P.H. Martin & B.M. Kramer, Williams and Meyers Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, 13' ed.
(Newark: Matthew Bender, 2006).
54. FederalAccord Act, supra note 13, s. 47.
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There are only a handful of cases where the term has been considered. 5
These cases are largely administrative law cases considering the issues of
procedural fairness and standard of judicial review and are not, with the
exception of the King's Cove case, particularly helpful for the interpretation
of the term "significant discovery."
In the King's Cove case, Petro-Canada had applied to the CNLOPB
for a declaration of significant discovery and the matter was referred to
the Oil and Gas Committee. After receipt of the Oil and Gas Committee's
recommendations, the application was denied. Petro-Canada then brought
an application for an order in the nature of certiorari seeking to have the
CNLOPB's decision quashed. In the context of considering fallow field
issues, the case is interesting because of its discussion of the nature of
a significant discovery. Of the five issues identified by the trial judge,
one was whether the CNLOPB was entitled to consider the volume of oil
and the economics of production in evaluating the potential for "sustained
production," a key element of the statutory definition of significant
discovery. The Oil and Gas Committee thought so and the CNLOPB
agreed. The Oil and Gas Committee in its report to the CNLOPB (portions
of which are cited in the trial judge's reasons and reproduced here)
indicated that:
any accumulation of hydrocarbons has some potential to be produced
and that the term "potential for sustained production" leaves the reader
to ask "for how long" and "at what rate". In the words of the Oil and
Gas Committee "a cupful a day forever
5 6 is sustained production but can
hardly be categorized as significant.
Petro-Canada submitted that the CNLOPB erred by considering the size
of the hydrocarbon accumulation and the economics of production. The
economics of production test, it submitted, was the test applicable to a
declaration of commercial discovery. The trial judge disagreed stating:
Common sense requires consideration of economics and, therefore, of
the volume of recoverable oil, in determining the "potential for sustained
production".... I agree with the committee's conclusion that in a broad
sense, evidence is required to suggest that the feature is of sufficient
magnitude and quality to hold reasonable promise of continuous
55. See Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Minister of Energy Mines and Resources (1990), 35 ET.R. 5;
Mobil Oil Canada,Ltd. v. Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202,
rev'g (1992), 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 95 (Nfld. C.A.), aff'g (1990), 87 Nfld. & PE.I.R. 58 (Nfld. T.D.)
[Nautilus]; Petro-Canadav. Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore Petroleum Board, (1995) 127 D.L.R.
(41) 483 (Nfld. T.D.) [King s Cove]; and Hibernia Management and Development Company Ltd. v.
Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore Petroleum Board,2007 NLTD 14.
56. Petro-Canadav. Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore Petroleum Board,[1995] N.J. No. 258.
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production of a volume to warrant the effort of producing it. ... I also
agree with the committee's conclusion that the legislation requires
the board to look for "some winning combination of size and quality
of the accumulation, and technology and economics such that these
hydrocarbons could be profitably produced.... The committee clearly
distinguished between the test in the definition of commercial discovery
and those for a significant discovery. It properly justified considerations
of volume and quality and economics in the latter case as necessary to
recognize "reality" and "practicality". 7
While the legislation does not expressly include an economic test,
it is the writer's view that the result in the King's Cove case is correct.
Without some reference to economics how would one determine that a
discovery is significant? Governments do not grant oil and gas rights and
oil companies do not conduct exploration simply to achieve technical
success. It is reasonable to assume that the legislative intent underlying the
definition recognizes this, particularly when the consequence of making
a significant discovery is the right to a significant discovery licence and
indefinite tenure. The difficulty, of course, is to what extent economics
can or should be considered at the significant discovery stage. As one
might reasonably expect, this uncertainty is reflected in the CNLOPB and
CNSOPB Joint Guidelines Regarding Applications for Significant and
Commercial Discovery Declarations and Amendments.5 8 Governments
and oil companies will, having different interests, no doubt have differing
views and one might expect further litigation to clarify the point.
2. Commercialdiscovery
Terms such as commercial discovery, commerciality and commercial
success are terms that are widely understood in the industry, albeit with
certain nuances depending on the context in which the terms are used.

57. Ibid.
58. The Joint Guidelines are available on the Boards' websites at <www.cnlopb.nl.ca> and <www.
cnsopb.ns.ca>. Interestingly, the Joint Directives state at II that "although accumulation and sustained production creates some connotation of volume and economics, the Information required is
not intended to be commercially supportive in nature."
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Various definitions have been put forward.59 The common theme is that
development of a discovery will result in the licensee recovering its costs
and earning a reasonable rate of return or profit. The Accord Acts define
a commercial discovery, not inconsistent with industry understanding, as
follows:
Commercial Discovery means a discovery of petroleum that has been
demonstrated to contain petroleum reserves that justify the
investment
6
of capital and effort to bring the discovery to production. 0
Like the definition of significant discovery, the definition of commercial
discovery is not without its difficulties. The potential for controversy lies
in what constitutes justification to invest. This entails a consideration
of nuierous variables that government and industry might disagree on.
These include technical matters such as quantity, quality and deliverability
of reserves and economic factors such as the appropriate capital structure
for the industry generally and for a project in particular, the appropriate
rate of return, the costs of capital (debt and equity), predictions regarding
future prices for petroleum and anticipated project revenues and the
appropriate fiscal terms, that is to say, royalties and taxes.- Disputes
between government and industry as to what constitutes a commercial
discovery must be resolved by negotiation or by litigation. In cases where
a hearing before the Oil and Gas Committee is requested, the parties will
have the benefit of the recommendations of the Committee to facilitate
negotiations or, failing agreement, as part of the record in judicial review
proceedings. To date, there is no jurisprudence interpreting the relevant
provisions of the AccordActs.
3. Tenure system
The three-tiered tenure system applicable to the CCS reflects, in the
writer's view, a relatively generous legislative response to certain
controversial aspects of the NEP and is intended to provide stability and

59. See Johnston, supra note 2 at 296. Johnston defines commercial discovery in the following
terms:, "In popular usage, the term applies to any discovery that would be economically feasible to
develop under a given fiscal system. As a contractual term, it often applies to the requirement on the
part of the contractor to demonstrate to the government that a discovery would be sufficiently profitable
to develop from both the contractor's and the government's point of view. A field that satisfied these
conditions would then be granted commercial status, and the contractor would then have the right to
develop the field." See also chap. 6 for a discussion of exploration versus development thresholds and
technical versus commercial success. See also Williams and Meyers Manual of Oil and Gas Terms,
supra note 53, for definitions of commercial deposit, commercial oil pool, commercial production,
commercial quantity, commercial well, production and production in paying quantities and the further
references and authorities cited.
60. FederalAccordAct, supra note 13, s. 47.
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fairness. It is also the writer's view that the tenure system and call for bids
process under the AccordActs are robust and flexible enough to address
most fallow field issues.
The exploration licence available under the AccordActs is an extremely
flexible instrument. The licence must contain such terms and conditions
as may be prescribed in the regulations and may contain any other terms
and conditions, not inconsistent with the statute or the regulations, as may
be agreed on by the Board and the licence holder.6 The legislation is not
particularly prescriptive as to the terms and conditions to be included in the
licence. Legislatively, one limiting feature is that the term may not exceed
nine years and may not be extended or renewed. 62 This affords government
a variety of options to deal with fallow field issues, such as length of term,
required work programs, escalating rentals, mandatory relinquishment
and so forth. As a practical matter, however, the terms and conditions are
subject to market constraints inherent in the open and competitive call
for bids process required under the Accord Acts. Overly onerous terms
and conditions will be met with disinterest by the oil industry resulting in
disappointing licensing rounds and, ultimately, be counterproductive to
government policy objectives. What is attainable depends on perceptions
of the prospectivity of the acreage offered and predictions on technical
feasibility, costs and revenues.
The production licence is equally flexible. It must be in the form
prescribed in the regulations and may contain any terms and conditions, not
inconsistent with the statute or the regulations, as may be agreed on by the
Board and the licence holder.63 Fallow field issues can be anticipated and
dealt with to a large extent in advance. To avoid disputes, misunderstandings
and delays, these terms and conditions may be established in advance and
incorporated in the call for bids process. The term of a production licence
is twenty-five years and is extended for so long as there is commercial
production and may be extended where there are reasonable grounds
to believe that commercial production Will recommence in the future. 64
While this degree of security of tenure is generous, it is not out of line with
other tenure systems generally and is intended to promote investment and
development.

61. Ibid. s. 67.
62. Ibid. s. 69.
63. Ibid. s. 81(4).
64. Ibid. s. 84. What constitutes reasonable grounds to believe that production will recommence in
the future has not yet arisen in that no production licence issued in respect of CCS acreage has reached
the end of its primary term.
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Again, the significant discovery licence is a flexible instrument.
The significant discovery licence must be in the form prescribed in the
regulations and may contain any other terms and conditions, not inconsistent
with the statute or the regulations, as may be agreed on by the Board
and the licence holder.65 The comments made above in respect of terms
and conditions and the call for bids process in the context of exploration
licences and production licences apply to the significant discovery licence
as well. What is unique about the significant discovery licence and the most
generous aspect of the tenure system is its indefinite term. A significant
discovery licence remains in force during the same period as the related
declaration of significant discovery remains in force. 66
The making of a call for bids by the Boards i's a fundamental decision
and, as such, is subject to ministerial approval. The Accord Acts do not
define fundamental decisions by reference to overarching principles. Rather,
fundamental decisions are simply those Board decisions that are stated in
the legislation to be fundamental decisions. In other words, fundamental
decisions comprise a list, which upon review appears to encompass those
Board decisions of greatest importance. Subject to the constraints of the
Accord Acts, this affords government a degree of political oversight and
policy input into Board decisions.
The Accord Acts implement a joint federal-provincial resource
management scheme. The legislation contemplates that fundamental
decisions will, be approved at the ministerial level by both levels of
government. If consensus cannot be reached, the legislation provides
for a sequence of suspensive and overriding vetoes in favour of either
the provincial government or federal government, depending on the
circumstances, to break deadlocks. 67 In addition, the federal and provincial
ministers may jointly issue directives in relation to fundamental decisions,
68
which joint directives are binding on the Boards.
4. Statutory levers
The generous nature of the tenure system is, however, tempered by certain
statutory levers and mechanisms intended to address fallow field issues,
namely the power of the Boards:
1. to make drilling orders and development orders;

65.
66.
67.
68.

Ibid. s. 73(4).
Ibid. s. 75(3).
Ibid. ss. 31-40.
Ibid. s. 42.
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2. to make declarations of significant and commercial discoveries
on the Board's own initiative; and
3. to amend or revoke declarations of significant and commercial
discoveries.
The Boards may at any time after making a declaration of significant
discovery order the licence holder to drill a well in the significant
discovery area.69 The licence in question may be an exploration licence,
a significant discovery licence or a production licence. The making of a
subsequent declaration of commercial discovery does not mean that the
earlier significant discovery declaration is no longer in force where the
acreage under the two declarations is the same or there is an overlap.
Drilling orders are fundamental decisions and are subject to a hearing
before the Oil and Gas Committee if requested by the licence holder. No
order may be made within six months of the completion of a well drilled
prior to the making of the order or within three years of the completion of
the drilling of the discovery well upon which the significant discovery is
made. In addition, no order may require the licence holder to drill more
than one well at a time.
Apart from these time and number constraints, the legislation does not
set limits or conditions on the invocation of the drilling order power. The
drilling order power has, however, been scaled back somewhat from that
contained in the CanadaOil and GasAct in response to industry objections
but, nevertheless, remains an important statutory lever to deal with fallow
field concerns. Having regard to the purpose of the power, the lack of
statutory limits (apart from timing) on its use, and the technical issues
involved, one would expect a considerable degree of curial deference on
judicial review of decisions by the Boards to invoke it.7"
As noted, certain Board decisions are subject to review by the Oil
and Gas Committee prior to their implementation. 7' When a hearing is
requested, the licence holder may make submissions to the Oil and Gas
Committee. The Oil and Gas Committee then makes its recommendations
to the Board and the Board is required to consider them but, in the end, such
recommendations are not binding on the Board. However, Board decisions
in respect of which a hearing is held before the Oil and Gas Committee
are subject to judicial review. A hearing before the Oil and Gas Committee

69. Ibid.s. 76.
70. Supra note 55. Comments made by the courts in the cases cited support this proposition,
particularly where the matters in question are of a technical nature.
71. FederalAccord Act, supra note 13, s. 124.
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was not available under the CanadaOil and Gas Act but was introduced in
the CanadaPetroleum Resources Act and, in turn, carried forward in the
Accord Acts. The purpose of the change was to afford licence holders an
opportunity to make their case, so to speak, on technical matters and have
these considered by the Board. In that regard, it should be noted that the
Oil and Gas Committee must have at least two members with specialized,
expert or technical knowledge of petroleum.7 2 The policy intent of this was
to ensure the Board would have the benefit of technical expertise and input
in making decisions and to create a more comprehensive record should the
decision become subject to judicial review. To be blunt, it was hoped that
Board decisions would not be made that were at odds with the technical
merits.
The power to issue development orders did not exist under the Canada
Oil and Gas Act. This power represents a more refined statutory lever to
spur development than simple reliance on the drilling order power. Under
the AccordActs, the Boards may at any time after making a declaration of
commercial discovery give notice to the licence holder, where production
has not commenced, stating that after a specified period of not less than
six months the term of the licence will be reduced.73 The order may be
made in relation to any portion of the commercial discovery area. In other
words, production in one portion of the commercial discovery area does
not necessarily prevent the making of a development order in respect of
another portion of the same commercial discovery area. During this period,
the Boards must provide the licence holder a reasonable opportunity to
make submissions as to why an order reducing the term should not be
made. Where the Board is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to
do so, the Board may then make an order reducing the term of the licence
to three years or such longer period as may be specified in the order. If
production is commenced within the required period, the order ceases to
have effect and is deemed to have been vacated. The purpose of this power
is to force development or in its absence to cause a relinquishment of
the acreage. As noted above, the making of a declaration of commercial
discovery does not shield the licence holder from drilling orders. The
development order may be made in respect of acreage held under an
exploration licence, significant discovery licence or a production licence.
The making of a development order is a fundamental decision subject to
ministerial approval and is subject to a hearing before the Oil and Gas
Committee if requested by the licence holder.
72.
73.

Ibid. s. 124.
Ibid. s. 79.
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Whether a declaration of significant discovery is made on the
application of the licence holder or at the initiative of the Boards, the areal
extent of the acreage subject to the declaration is not cast in stone. The
declaration may be revoked if it is later determined that the discovery is
not significant or may be amended by increasing or decreasing the areal
extent of the acreage if it is later determined that the areal extent of the
discovery is different than originally described in the declaration.7 4 The
same is true of declarations of commercial discovery.75 The legislation
provides for corresponding adjustments in the acreage held under the
applicable licences.7 6 However, the .legislation requires and the Nautilus
case77 confirms that such determinations must be based on the results of
further drilling. For example, such determinations cannot be made on the
basis of a reinterpretation of existing or new seismic data. It is debatable
whether this is an appropriate constraint, but the constraint cuts both ways.
The intent of the further drilling requirement does serve as a check on
arbitrary revocation or amendment at the initiative of government. Board
decisions to revoke or amend a declaration of significant or commercial
discovery are subject to a hearing before the Oil and Gas Committee
if requested by the licence holder. Such decisions are not fundamental
decisions requiring ministerial approval.
As can be seen from the design of the legislative scheme, the Accord
Acts provide an array of levers that can be used to address government
fallow field concerns while affording licence holders with a reasonable
degree of security of tenure and procedural fairness. Use of the drilling
order or development order power does raise important policy issues. The
use of these powers by governments is not likely to be welcomed by the
industry; their use will become one more factor along with geology and
economics in assessing the attractiveness of the CCS as a region in which
to invest. To the writer's knowledge, these powers have not, as yet, been
invoked or been the subject of judicial consideration.
5. New Fallow FieldInitiatives
With regard to fallow field issues, the argument can be made that the Accord
Acts provide a reasonable balance between the interests of government

74.
75.
76.
77.

Ibid. s. 71.
Ibid. s. 78(3).
Ibid.s. 74 and s. 83.
Supra note 55.
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and industry. 78 There remains, however, the potentially contentious issue
of imposing additional exploration or development obligations and new
relinquishment requirements in respect of existing licences. The terms
and conditions of existing licences have already been set. These cannot be
retroactively and unilaterally changed in the absence of amendment to the
AccordActs. A precedent for doing so was established by the NEP through
the enactment of the CanadaOil and Gas Act. The wisdom of that policy
decision has been thoroughly debated and the current legislative scheme
governing the CCS is to a large degree the result of that debate. Legislative
change is always an option but would require policy agreement and
legislative action at both the federal and provincial level if the joint federalprovincial resource management regime implemented by the Accord Acts
is to be preserved. Unilateral action by either level of government would
result in a return to the jurisdictional quagmire that existed prior to the
offshore accords.79 Short of legislative change, recourse can be had to the

existing statutory levers reviewed above.
The U.K. fallow field initiative provides an interesting example of
one jurisdiction's response to concerns over the pace of exploration and
development and may provide lessons for the CCS. This rather elaborate
and sophisticated system is not embedded in legislation and was achieved
voluntarily in the context of a statutory regime which this writer submits
has fewer statutory levers available to government than exist under the
AccordActs. There are, however, other important contextual differences. In
contrast to the CCS, the UKCS has a large number of existing licences and
.operators and the secondary market for trading in licences contemplated
by the system has the critical mass to at least be a potentially viable and
practical option. The UKCS is a far more mature oil and gas region than
the CCS with a well developed infrastructure and large technical data base.

78. That was the legislative intent of the federal government as described in its policy statement,
entitled Canada s Energy Frontiers:A Frameworkfor Investment and Jobs, released in 1985 by the
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources where at 7 it states "The legislative framework for the
frontier must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the varying requirements for joint management and
revenue sharing ... At the same time it should, as much as possible, provide consistency in relation
to fundamental rights and procedures in all parts of the frontier. The new legislation will reflect this
balance." The policy statement at 8 describes the three forms of licences to be made available under
the new legislation and the rationale underlying the indefinite term of the significant discovery licence
and long term of the production licence. The stated objectives of the federal-provincial accords
implemented by the AccordActs reflect the desire to achieve early development of petroleum resources
within a stable administrative regime for the industry consistent throughout Canada's offshore areas.
79. See R. E. Quesnel & R. J. Thrasher, "East Coast Project Financing Issues" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J.
214 at 224-27 for a discussion of the constitutional setting and delicate political balance underlying
the AccordActs.
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The geology of the UKCS and available markets for UKCS production
are, of course, quite different.
Conclusions
Fallow field concerns are a critical aspect in the design of all oil and gas
legal regimes. Current fallow field issues with regard to the CCS can only
be fully understood in light of the legislative history leading up to the
enactment of the Accord Acts. That history shows how legislation reflects
the particular policy priorities of the government of the day. In the case of
the CCS, the relevant legislation started with a generous land tenure system
followed by a rather severe fallow field initiative under the NEP and the.
CanadaOil and Gas Act. In response to strong industry opposition to that
initiative, the current regime was implemented, first with the enactment
of the Canada Petroleum Resources Act followed shortly thereafter by
enactment of the Accord Acts. The current regime was designed to strike
a reasonable balance between the interests of government and industry.
No regime is perfect; however, in this writer's view there are adequate
provisions in the current legislation to deal with fallow field concerns as
they arise. To the extent that this view is incorrect, there are options. One
would be for government and industry to attempt to achieve a mutually
satisfactory resolution of issues through consultation and cooperation
inside the existing legislative framework. Another option would be to
embark yet again on an exercise in statutory change seeking that elusive
balance.
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APPENDIX 1
UK FALLOW FIELD PROCESS
ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (DTI)
REVIEW

DTI
Fallow Acreage
Annual Determination (1)

IFallow Blocks
No Discovery

I

I
Fallow Discoveries
Discovery (2)

(1) No drilling for 4 years or seismic for 2 years
(2) Discovery need not be commercial
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